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The significance of conditional cash transfer programmes
(CCTs) has grown in recent years, particularly in Latin America.
Nicaragua’s CCT, the Red de Protección Social (RPS), had a short
life span (2000–2006). Nonetheless, the programme received
international acclaim for its achievements. The RPS regularly directed
funds to female household heads conditional on the households’
fulfilment of certain co-responsibilities (or conditionalities, as
they were known until recently). These included children’s school
attendance, medical check-ups at local health centres and mothers’
participation in educational sessions.
Evaluation of RPS’s first phase found that it had significantly
increased school enrolment and other education indicators
(Maluccio and Flores, 2005). Perhaps more impressively, it had
reduced stunting by 5 percentage points in treatment
communities, an unexpectedly large result (IFPRI, 2005). These
outcomes, combined with other positive assessments of its
performance, made RPS something of a model CCT. To the surprise
of many members of the international community, however, the
Nicaraguan government voluntarily discontinued the programme.
What happened?
The downfall of RPS came not from its lack of impact, but partly
because of its failure to establish and maintain a positive image for
itself within Nicaragua. The experience highlights the need for CCTs
to garner national support and foster domestic understanding of
their objectives and policies. This is particularly true of CCTs that
depend on external funding, which may be absorbed in meeting
the demands of the organisations providing the finance.
RPS would have benefited from a campaign that increased internal
support from both government officials and the non-beneficiary
populace. Sentiments in Nicaragua about RPS tended to be polarised
and uninformed. Some common opinions were misleading, and RPS
officials grappled with domestic opposition arising from a lack of
understanding of the programme’s objectives and procedures.
Domestic pessimism and misperceptions ranged from the
programme’s purpose to policies and impacts. There was a
persistent belief that RPS was not concerned with alleviating
long-term poverty, but rather that it was perpetuating poverty by
giving cash transfers to the poor. In reality, RPS was noteworthy for
its focus on using conditional transfers as a mechanism to initiate
behavioural changes and increase investment in long-term human
capital accumulation. The programme’s educational components
and co-responsibilities, while central to RPS, were not well known
or understood among domestic critics.
Another complaint was that the programme was inefficient and too
expensive. RPS might have received greater support if government
officials had understood all the services the programme provided—
why RPS managed these services rather than others, and the long-
term savings the current expenses were expected to generate. If the
programme’s positive impacts had been clearly and consistently
communicated, some of these accusations might have been tempered.
Rather than addressing these attacks, RPS officials focused on
satisfying the requirements of the programme’s loans in order
to ensure that it could continue to receive funding for future
phases. They were also unduly concerned with responding to
external criticisms that might endanger its funding. This approach,
while not unreasonable, neglected important domestic
constituencies whose negative opinions and misperceptions
ultimately contributed to the programme’s demise.
The lack of domestic understanding ultimately overwhelmed
the programme. Nicaraguan support could not be maintained,
and RPS’s autonomy was eventually eroded. Officials were forced
to share RPS resources with other groups, to the detriment of the
programme’s own efforts. The mission was diluted. Officials and
resources were spread too thinly, and efficiency and enthusiasm
were damaged. Eventually, RPS was discontinued, to the surprise
of many within the international community, who understood the
programme’s purpose and impacts better than domestic constituents.
The end of the Nicaraguan experience with RPS is disappointing
in light of the programme’s achievements, but it provides relevant
lessons to policymakers working with CCTs, particularly those
receiving external funding. Even if a programme is deemed
successful to the international community, domestic constituents
must still approve of it. The support of both the non-beneficiary
populace and government officials is important. Key domestic
officials may change over time, and support cannot be provided
solely by a few officials who may not remain in their positions.
Frequent communication of a programme’s purposes, policies
and results is important to gaining and maintaining support.
Without steady domestic approval, even an excellent programme
may lose support and eventually be discontinued. With such support,
the programme is more likely to continue to function, improve and
enjoy greater backing and influence.
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